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	<title>Comments on: Can mom verify a HealthVault application?</title>
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	<link>http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/</link>
	<description>Strategies for Internet citizens</description>
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		<title>By: Can mom verify a HealthVault application?</title>
		<link>http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-100337</link>
		<dc:creator>Can mom verify a HealthVault application?</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Dec 2007 21:10:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-100337</guid>
		<description>[...] for Internet citizens    &#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;&#160;   Can mom verify a HealthVault application?  In response to some questions about creating standalone HealthVault applications, Eric Gunnerson [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] for Internet citizens    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;   Can mom verify a HealthVault application?  In response to some questions about creating standalone HealthVault applications, Eric Gunnerson [...]</p>
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		<title>By: David Magda</title>
		<link>http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-70822</link>
		<dc:creator>David Magda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Oct 2007 23:05:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-70822</guid>
		<description>&lt;blockquote&gt;How do we give mom a reasonable assurance that her family’s health data will not be phished?&lt;/blockquote&gt;

You don&#039;t and can&#039;t.

We had fraud and falsification in the past, before computers, and we&#039;ll have it in the future. If people can make money by subverting things they will be subverted. You can make it hader by adding encryption and trust algorithms (PKI, Trusted Computer, HTTPS, AES), but in the end you have to draw a line somewhere (app, OS, BIOS, TPM chip, Marine with shiney shoes and a .45 ACP) and that&#039;s where the attacks will happen.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><p>How do we give mom a reasonable assurance that her family’s health data will not be phished?</p></blockquote>
<p>You don&#8217;t and can&#8217;t.</p>
<p>We had fraud and falsification in the past, before computers, and we&#8217;ll have it in the future. If people can make money by subverting things they will be subverted. You can make it hader by adding encryption and trust algorithms (PKI, Trusted Computer, HTTPS, AES), but in the end you have to draw a line somewhere (app, OS, BIOS, TPM chip, Marine with shiney shoes and a .45 ACP) and that&#8217;s where the attacks will happen.</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Jon Udell</title>
		<link>http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-70646</link>
		<dc:creator>Jon Udell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Oct 2007 12:46:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-70646</guid>
		<description>&quot;Of course you can try embedding “trusting computing” in the hardware, but that simply brings up the question of who do you trust?.&quot;

That movie is beautifully done. But at the end we&#039;re back to the same place. How do we give mom a reasonable assurance that her family&#039;s health data will not be phished?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;Of course you can try embedding “trusting computing” in the hardware, but that simply brings up the question of who do you trust?.&#8221;</p>
<p>That movie is beautifully done. But at the end we&#8217;re back to the same place. How do we give mom a reasonable assurance that her family&#8217;s health data will not be phished?</p>
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		<title>By: David Magda</title>
		<link>http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-70440</link>
		<dc:creator>David Magda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Oct 2007 22:20:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-70440</guid>
		<description>You say

&lt;blockquote&gt;There are, of course, cryptographic protocols that could be used to verify a client application.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

and 

&lt;blockquote&gt;How are you going to walk her through the protocols necessary to assure that a client application she downloads from the Net is properly certified for use with HealthVault&lt;/blockquote&gt;

But the first &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.microsoft.com/technet/archive/community/columns/security/essays/10imlaws.mspx?mfr=true&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Immutable Law of (Computer) Security&lt;/a&gt; is

&lt;blockquote&gt;If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your computer, it&#039;s not your computer anymore&lt;/blockquote&gt;

Of course you can try embedding &quot;trusting computing&quot; in the hardware, but that simply brings up the question of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.lafkon.net/tc/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;who do you trust?&lt;/a&gt;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You say</p>
<blockquote><p>There are, of course, cryptographic protocols that could be used to verify a client application.</p></blockquote>
<p>and </p>
<blockquote><p>How are you going to walk her through the protocols necessary to assure that a client application she downloads from the Net is properly certified for use with HealthVault</p></blockquote>
<p>But the first <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/technet/archive/community/columns/security/essays/10imlaws.mspx?mfr=true" rel="nofollow">Immutable Law of (Computer) Security</a> is</p>
<blockquote><p>If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your computer, it&#8217;s not your computer anymore</p></blockquote>
<p>Of course you can try embedding &#8220;trusting computing&#8221; in the hardware, but that simply brings up the question of <a href="http://www.lafkon.net/tc/" rel="nofollow">who do you trust?</a>.</p>
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		<title>By: Simon Willison</title>
		<link>http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-70365</link>
		<dc:creator>Simon Willison</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Oct 2007 17:09:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.jonudell.net/2007/10/18/can-mom-verify-a-healthvault-application/#comment-70365</guid>
		<description>There was &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.cio.com/article/135500/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;a fascinating series&lt;/a&gt; on CIO.com recently about the increasingly sophisticated service economy behind malware, and how it&#039;s almost impossible for banks to protect against exploits running on infected machines. &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.cio.com/article/135551/Hacker_Economics_MPACK_and_the_Next_Wave_of_Malware/2&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Key quote&lt;/a&gt;: &quot;In the next generation, we will all do business with infected end points&quot;.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There was <a href="http://www.cio.com/article/135500/" rel="nofollow">a fascinating series</a> on CIO.com recently about the increasingly sophisticated service economy behind malware, and how it&#8217;s almost impossible for banks to protect against exploits running on infected machines. <a href="http://www.cio.com/article/135551/Hacker_Economics_MPACK_and_the_Next_Wave_of_Malware/2" rel="nofollow">Key quote</a>: &#8220;In the next generation, we will all do business with infected end points&#8221;.</p>
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